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Abstract.  
Economics imperialism is broadly explained as economics having an impact on other disciplines.  
But how should economics imperialism be understood when it is in some sense the product of 
other disciplines having an impact on economics?  The paper examines psychology’s impact on 
economics in connection with the emergence of behavioral development economics, and then 
discusses the nature of behavioral development economics imperialism associated with 
development economists’ explanations of non-market dimensions of life in developing 
economies in behavioral economics terms.  The paper argues that this new form of economics 
imperialism reflects economics’ selective appropriation from psychology of the Kahneman-
Tversky heuristics and biases view of choice behavior and rejection of the Gigerenzer-ABC 
group fast and frugal heuristics view.  This selective appropriation, however, causes behavioral 
development economics imperialism to also function as a social and cultural imperialism since its 
utility theory-based policy recommendations impose liberal society economic values on 
developing economy societies.  Thus recent economics-plus-psychology imperialism might be 
said to function as social science imperialism under the leadership of economics 
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1 Introduction: The different dimensions of economics imperialism 
Economics imperialism has been an important subject of investigation in the philosophy of economics 
and economic methodology since Gary Becker’s extension of neoclassical economic reasoning to non-
market social domains, long the province of other social sciences, generated new questions regarding 
the scope and nature of economics.  Among the methodological issues investigated were whether 
economics imperialism can be understood in Kuhnian terms (Fine, 2001, 2002) and whether it achieved 
or failed to achieve explanatory unification across disciplinary boundaries (Mäki, 2009).  However, while 
these discussions of economics imperialism mostly put aside whether economics is also subject to 
imperialistic incursions from other sciences, that issue needs to be investigated since clearly other 
disciplines have had an impact on economics as game theory, behavioral economics, experimentalism, 
evolutionary economics, agent-based modeling, and other new approaches in economics all have their 
origins outside of economics.  Note, then, that this significantly complicates the analysis of economics 
imperialism because it makes it unclear what economics’ identity is if its explanations rely on elements 
from other sciences which carry important weight relative to traditional economics concepts and 
principles (Davis, 2012).  For example, an early extension of Becker’s economics of the family went 
beyond neoclassical reasoning in using game theory to explain intra-household bargaining (Manser and 
Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981).  Was this economics imperialism or was it an imperialism of 
mathematics (where game theory originated) merely in transit through economics subsequent to its 
own imperialism into economics?1 
What the post-1980s history of economics thus tells us about economics imperialism is that prior to 
making any claims about economics having transformative effects on other sciences we need to 
investigate if other sciences have had transformative effects on economics.  But how does one go about 
doing this?  Suppose we begin by first making the assumption that economics has retained its relative 
autonomy as a science despite the influence of other sciences upon it.  Then one way to explain this is to 
say that other science contents that enter into economics need to be seen as being selectively 
appropriated or ‘domesticated’ in ways that somehow maintain economics’ separate identity as a 
science (though this could also be compatible with change in the definition and some of the main 
concerns of economics, perhaps even so much so as to depart from the neoclassical pre-1980s Lionel 
Robbins conception of the field).  This appropriation/domestication process arguably then proceeds 
through a series of debates and contests within economics over which concepts and principles from 
other fields ought to be regarded as enlarging traditional economic explanations.  For example, 
experimental research in economics under the impact of evidence from social psychology showing that 
people often cooperate has revolved in good part around debates over how or whether this evidence 
can be understood in terms of the principle of individual utility maximization (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).  
An important aspect of debates such as these, then, is that they tend to ignore or even suppress 
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 Herbert Simon suggested this kind of view: “The most salient fact in the postwar history of economics was its 
sudden conquest by mathematics and statistics ….  I think it could be said that by 1970 mathematics had taken 
over economics (for better or worse); the simplest theory had to be clothed in mathematical garb before it could 
receive any serious attention, and ‘empirical work’ was synonymous with ‘econometrics’” (Simon, 1991, pp. 325-
6). 
 
2 
 
important debates taking place in other sciences regarding the meaning of the concepts being absorbed 
into economics, particularly with respect to interpretations of these concepts which are not easily 
accommodated in economics.  For example, though cooperation can be explained in terms of people 
identifying with others despite it not being in their own interest (Sen, 1985) the dominant interpretation 
of social identity in economics explains it in terms of utility maximization (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). 
Thus, the selective appropriation process generally allows concepts and principles to travel across 
disciplinary boundaries but is likely to screen out certain interpretations of them as well as entire 
debates elsewhere about their meaning and significance.2   
Suppose we also assume that debates in economics about the value and relevance of other science 
contents to economics acquire special significance when they take place in applied fields in economics.  
That is, debate over what other sciences can contribute to economics acquires particular clarity and 
decidability for economists when the candidate concepts are applied in concrete explanatory contexts 
where procedures for their empirical investigation are available and potential policy implications are at 
issue.  For example, game theory acquired significant credibility in economics conceptually and as an 
important tool of analysis after it was used to explain market power dynamics in the field of industrial 
organization (see Schmallensee, 1988).  In effect, ‘realism’ counts when economists are forced to 
confront the question of whether their subject has practical value for others in the policy world 
(particularly when there is skepticism about what economics has to offer), compelling them to make 
sharper judgments regarding which concepts and principles they ought to employ, whatever their 
disciplinary origins.3  
This paper employs these two assumptions to investigate one recent case of economics imperialism 
explained as the product of the recent influence of psychology on economics and economics’ selective 
appropriation of a set of concepts from psychology concerning the cognitive nature of individual 
decision making.  The paper argues, first, that an active debate in psychology between two views of 
choice heuristics, the heuristics and biases/prospect theory approach of Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky and the fast and frugal heuristics/adaptive toolbox approach of Gerd Gigerenzer and the ABC 
research group, has been largely ignored in economics due to its adoption of the former approach in 
virtue of its conformability to utility maximization reasoning, and, second, that this adoption has 
produced a behavioral development economics imperialism which targets a wide range of behaviors in 
developing nations customarily regarded as non-economic (for example, use of bed nets at home to 
prevent malaria).  It is further argued that this new economics-plus-psychology imperialism – a social 
science imperialism under the leadership of economics – is also a social and cultural imperialism, 
because development economists’ policy recommendations when based on behavioral economics’ 
utility theory reasoning apply advanced country liberal values and conceptions regarding how societies 
                                                          
2
 A separate issue not addressed here concerns debates regarding which contents from different sciences can be 
accommodated to economics’ distinctive explanatory goals, for example, whether ideas from game theory or 
psychology are better able to explain choice behavior. 
3
This has been claimed as an important justification for behavioral economics.  For example, Camerer (2006) 
argues that behavioral economics has many potential applications. 
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ought to function to countries where those values are either absent or compete with different values 
and conceptions of society.4   
The balance of this paper is organized as follows.  The second section of the paper briefly distinguishes 
and compares the two different approaches in psychology to the cognitive nature of individual decision 
making: the heuristics and biases/prospect theory approach of Kahneman and Tversky (the ‘new’ or 
modern behavioral economics) and the fast and frugal heuristics/adaptive toolbox approach of 
Gigerenzer and the Adaptive Behavior and Cognition (ABC) research group (the ‘old’ or classical 
behavioral economics following the thinking of Herbert Simon5).  It then argues that the Kahneman-
Tversky approach has been adopted by economists because it assumes that rational behavior in the 
standard sense is a normative ideal which can in principle be realized through proper policy design of 
choice architectures.  The third section discusses how behavioral development economics draws on the 
Kahneman-Tversky heuristics and biases approach.  The poor are said to be unable to escape poverty 
because their cognitive biases put them at greater risk than the non-poor.  But if policies aimed at 
changing their ‘default’ choices can be designed, they can be ‘nudged’ toward rational choices which 
would improve their welfare.  The fourth section argues that behavioral development economics is an 
economics/social science imperialism which is also a social and cultural developed country imperialism 
that operates especially through the channel of the advanced country expert policy advisors.  Central to 
the argument is how the meaning of policy paternalism espoused by behavioral economists differs 
between developed and developing economy societies.  The fifth and concluding section discusses the 
idea of a social science imperialism under the leadership of economics, and recommends it as an 
improvement on the traditional economics imperialism idea. 
 
2 The psychologists’ debate: Prospect theory versus the adaptive toolbox 
Fundamental to the difference between psychology’s prospect theory approach of Kahneman and 
Tversky and the adaptive tool box approach of Gigerenzer and the ABC research group are two quite 
different conceptions of the nature of heuristics, seen by both as characteristic features of human 
decision-making.  For Kahneman and Tversky and their followers, heuristics are regarded as cognitive 
biases that distort rational decision-making, that is, as perceptual and inferential mechanisms tied to the 
human make-up that prevent individuals from making fully rational or utility maximizing choices.  A long 
list of such mechanisms has been extensively investigated by both psychologists and economists (see 
Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, 2002).  Prospect theory as a theory of choice itself employs an 
individual value function – regarded as a psychologically more realistic analogue to the standard rational 
choice theory individual utility function – that is expressed in terms of two scales: one which assigns 
weights to different types of probabilities, whereby people overreact to small probability events and 
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It should be noted that Gigerenzer-ABC group may be keener to distinguish itself from the Kahneman-Tversky 
approach than the reverse.  Yet the latter has not altogether hesitated to claim distinctiveness for its approach (cf. 
Kahneman and Tversky, 1996). 
 
5
For Simon’s orientation and influence, see Velupillai and Ying Fang (forthcoming). 
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underreact to medium and large probability events, and a second scale which assigns subjective value to 
prospects relative to choice reference points, whereby people are risk-averse with respect to gains and 
risk-seeking with respect to losses.  Standard theory utility functions are then reclassified as normative 
or idealized explanations of choice, while the individual value function of prospect theory is 
characterized as a descriptive representation of the choices that people actually make (Thaler, 2000; see 
Heukelom, 2011).  An implication of this is that properly designed choice architectures (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2008), a policy-driven construction of the settings in which people make choices, should in 
principle make it possible for people to choose in a nearly rational way, that is, as if they had complete 
information about the consequences of their choices and were able to compensate for their cognitive 
biases.  Thus standard rational choice theory functions as a central point of reference for prospect 
theory not only as a normative ideal but also as a potentially realizable state of affairs that could be 
brought about by active policy intervention.  The understanding of choice heuristics in the Kahneman 
and Tversky approach is accordingly a matter of explaining imperfections in human behavior which 
could be corrected in such a manner as to allow people to act in a utility maximizing way. 
The understanding of choice heuristics on the part of Gigerenzer and the ABC research group (e.g., 
Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001) is quite different. Fast and frugal heuristics, as they are called, are seen to 
be simple cognitive rules or procedures that human beings employ to make choices in uncertain 
environments which dispense with the need for complete information and for the decision-maker to 
have a high degree of computational capacity.  They are not cognitive biases which limit rational 
decision making in the standard sense as for Kahneman and Tversky, but rather rational and efficient 
means of making choices in the form of cognitive tools specifically adapted to the occasion of choice.  
That is, following Simon’s understanding of bounded rationality (e.g., Simon, 1956) fast and frugal 
heuristics are procedurally or ecologically rational rather than substantively rational.  As such, they do 
not incorporate the utility values and probability measures of standard rationality theory.  This means 
that in contrast to Kahneman and Tversky’s view that standard rationality theory is normative but 
unrealistic, for Gigerenzer and the ABC group standard theory operates with an altogether incorrect 
view of rationality, much less one that has normative value, while the heuristics and biases approach 
provides an unrealistic explanation of human decision-making.  The root of the difference between the 
two views of heuristics thus comes down to their opposed views of standard rationality – a difference 
that can be explained in terms of two different conceptions of the kind of search process which the 
decision-maker engages in prior to choice.  For Kahneman and Tversky, the search process is a matter of 
locating an expected utility optimum, where that search process is obstructed by a multitude of 
perceptual and inferential biases.  For Gigerenzer and the ABC group, the search process is understood 
as a problem-solving activity, and the heuristics decision-makers employ are useful shortcuts that 
selectively guide the search for solutions to those problems.  Thus the ‘fast and frugal’ idea may also be 
expressed by the idea that ‘less is more’ – less information requirements and less needed computational 
capacity makes for more effective decision-making.  In general, then, social policies intended to improve 
decision-making opportunities must be sensitive to the concrete circumstances of choice, and attentive 
to how people actually solve decision problems.  Their established heuristics are likely to be adaptive to 
their circumstances, and not in need of correction. 
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Given that the Kahneman-Tversky and the Gigerenzer-ABC group approaches differ substantially in 
regard to their interpretation of the nature of decision heuristics, it is also worth comparing them in 
regard to their different views of what a decision-maker is, or what a person is, especially as this is 
relevant to their different implications for the application of psychological thinking in the applied 
economics field of development economics.  Indeed here there is also a fundamental contrast.  Since 
standard rationality theory is for Kahneman and Tversky the way decision-makers ideally behave, it 
follows that people are essentially utility maximizing beings, meaning that they are defined as 
collections of subjective preferences.  Saying a preference is ‘subjective’ means that it is a motivation 
which is unconditioned by the circumstances which occasion its expression (such as changes in prices 
and incomes).  That is, preference affects choice, but there is no feedback effect from the individual’s 
choice upon the preferences that motivated that choice.  Standard theory does allow that individuals’ 
preferences can change, but not as a result of individual decision-making.  Indeed, preference change is 
left unexplained in standard theory.  This not only secures the autonomy of the individual so central to 
liberal economics, but also means that individuals defined as collections of subjective preferences are 
incapable of learning about what motivates their choices.6   
In the case of Gigerenzer and the ABC group, rationality is explaining as ecological rationality in order to 
emphasize how individuals constantly adapt their decision-making to the changing circumstances of 
choice.  On this view, individuals are thus not collections of preferences but are rather collections of 
rules and procedures that they revise according to their relative adequacy – or ‘satisficing’ character, as 
Simon expressed it.  Thus they are not purely subjective beings, but through the feedback effects their 
choices have upon them are intimately embedded in the world, and thereby rather have what can be 
termed in contrast to the standard view an individuality that constantly evolves in its content and make-
up (Davis, 2012, pp. 142ff).  One thing this implies is that as adaptive beings the choices they make are 
reflective of the contexts in which they are made.  This multiplies the variety of motivations they have, 
and makes it difficult to identify a predictable list of incentives to ascribe to them.  This, we will see, is a 
key factor in regard to how these two types of psychological approaches can be employed in applied 
fields in economics, such as development theory, since they provide quite different views regarding how 
people’s behavior ought to be interpreted in concrete decision settings.  Indeed, this is especially 
important in the field of development economics since there are important differences between 
developing and developed economies with respect to social-economic contexts in which people make 
choices.  How, then, has behavioral economics made its way into the applied field of development 
economics? 
 
3 Behavioral Development Economics 
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Though they do learn in a Bayesian sense in regard to information about the world – a matter external to the 
individual.   
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Central to behavioral development economics is a new view of why people are in poverty in developing 
economies, and thus a new view of how it is possible for the poor to ‘escape’ poverty.  One traditional 
view on the subject is that the persistence of poverty is explained by a ‘culture of poverty’ which causes 
people to behave irrationally by the standards of people not in poverty, basically because their values 
and choices are distorted by living in poor communities (Lewis, 1969).  But behavioral development 
economists deny that the poor are any less rational than the non-poor.  As Abhijit Banerjee and Esther 
Duflo emphasize in their influential Poor Economics, the poor are little different from the non-poor since 
they exhibit the same cognitive weaknesses and biases which behavioral economists have studied in 
people generally.   
What is striking is that even people who are poor are just like the rest of us in almost every way.  
We have the same desires and weaknesses; the poor are no less rational than anyone else – 
quite the contrary (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011, p. ix) 
The difference between the poor and non-poor, then, is that “in poverty, with its narrow margins for 
error, the same behaviors often manifest themselves in more pronounced ways that can lead to worse 
outcomes” (Bertrand, Mullainathan, Shafir, 2004; also see Bertrand, Mullainathan, Shafir,2006).  That is, 
the conditions of poverty magnify the effects of people’s cognitive weaknesses and biases.  These 
conditions include lack of bank accounts, scarce health facilities, unreliable water supplies, high teacher 
absence rates, poor transportations systems, etc., which are usually not concerns for the non-poor, and 
thus do not expose them to the costs of ordinary biased decision-making.  But this also means there is 
good reason to believe that they might ‘escape’ poverty should it be possible to alter their choice 
circumstances in ways which reduce the scope of the ill effects that their cognitive weaknesses and 
biases have on them in particular.  The research strategy this then implies is that development 
economists ought to: (1) investigate how the poor make biased choices that affect their economic well-
being, and then (2) design and recommend institutional arrangements that correct for their decision-
making in ways that allow them to make rational, welfare-enhancing choices which would allow them to 
accumulate wealth and human capital sufficient to escape poverty. 
Regarding (1), how the poor make choices, Richard Thaler’s mental accounting view of cognitive 
behavior has been influential.  Thaler argues that people compartmentalize their thinking about 
spending into distinct budget categories, such as housing, education, food, and savings, and ignore 
rational trade-offs between them (Thaler, 1999).  Their budgeting decisions, in effect, ‘default’ to 
choices that reflect predetermined, fixed relationships between these categories.  One especially 
important cognitive bias that produces undesirable default-type choices with respect to current 
spending and saving for the future is time inconsistent behavior, as manifested in the tendency people 
have to continually procrastinate and postpone actions that they plan to undertake in the future.  
People behave time inconsistently when they value the present more highly than the future (employing 
what are called hyperbolic time discount rates), and default to current spending, thereby always 
postponing the saving which would improve their long-run economic circumstances.  Economists, 
however, judge it to be rational to value all periods in the same way (thus preferring that people use 
exponential time discount rates).  People would then be time consistent, would adequately save for the 
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future, and would think beyond their customary compartmentalization of their spending and saving 
decisions.   
Regarding (2), how institutions can be designed to correct for biased decision-making, the idea is to 
replace poor people’s customary default choices by rational ones. 
An important idea is that of default option: The government (or a well-meaning NGO) should 
make the option that it thinks is the best for most people the default choice, so that people will 
need to actively move away from it if they want to.  So people have the right to choose what 
they want, but there is a small cost of doing so, and as a result, most people end up choosing 
the default option (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011, p. 66). 
As the product of decision heuristics, default choices are easy choices, and thus costly to circumvent.  
What institutional design can accomplish, then, is to use the logic of default choice against irrational 
choice by making it costly for people to behave time inconsistently.   An example is setting up electronic 
bank deposits for government transfers to the poor (Bertrand, Mullainathan, Shafir, 2004, pp. 420-1).  
This can stimulate recipients to save out of income, since once the account is in place its holder sees 
how savings can accumulate, and must also take additional steps to spend down its balance in accessing 
the account (Benartzi and Thaler, 2004).  Following the argument of Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008), 
this is the policy idea of constructing a collection of institutional “’nudges’ tailored to the environment 
of developing countries” (Banerjee and Duflo, Ibid.).  Against the charge that ‘nudge’ policy is paternalist 
and interferes with people’s freedom, the response is that the “small cost” approach is one that in fact 
respects people’s freedom, since they are not compelled to act in a time consistent manner, and still 
have “the right to choose what they want.” People’s choice incentives are indeed changed by economic 
policies, but this has always been the case with policy interventions in the economy. 
Behavioral development economics, then, not only derives its main theoretical assumptions from the 
Kahneman-Tversky heuristics and biases approach, but it also extends that analysis, drawing concrete 
policy conclusions from it for developing economies.  For comparison, consider the view of policy 
implied by the Gigerenzer-ABC group fast and frugal heuristics approach.  Fast and frugal heuristics are 
decision-making rules that are generally well adapted to the circumstances of choice, in that they 
require limited computational capacity and make it possible for people to contend with a high degree of 
uncertainty.  As useful shortcuts, they selectively guide search to produce solutions to decision problems 
that are ecologically rational, implying that were one to ‘correct’ them by changing people’s decision 
defaults, one could actually inject bias into their decision-making, making it ecologically irrational, rather 
than remove it.  At the same time, adopting a fast and frugal heuristics approach does not mean that 
there is no space for policies aimed at improving social well-being.  For example, differences between 
countries regarding organ donation rates have been shown to reflect how people differ in their ‘default 
heuristics’ with regard to organ donation, and that these ‘default heuristics’ often reflect various 
government policies, some recognized and some not (Gigerenzer, 2010).  Thus policies designed to raise 
organ donation rates would not aim at government ‘nudging’ individuals to act differently but rather at 
changes in government rules and practices which cause individuals to default to certain behaviors.   
What particular policies this involves goes beyond the topic of this paper.  Policy questions are often 
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complicated requiring careful empirical research.  What the next section turns to, then, is how we might 
evaluate the effects of economics’ selective appropriation of ideas from psychology in connection with 
the idea of a behavioral development economics imperialism.   
 
4 Behavioral Development Economics Imperialism 
In the first section of this paper it was assumed that economics, like other social science disciplines, has 
retained a relative autonomy as a science, despite its extensive adoption since the 1980s of a variety of 
concepts and principles from other sciences.  The basis for that assumption is the idea that economics is 
selective in its appropriation of other science contents, and selective in such a way as to ensure that its 
overall organization of theoretical concerns and arguments remains ‘economic.’  On one level, for the 
field to sustain an investigation of the ‘economic’ in this way simply involves its continuing to address 
issues that have generally occupied it across the history of economics – issues such as how prices are 
determined, the sources of income and wealth, how markets work, what economic well-being involves, 
etc.  On a second level, however, for the field to continue to be concerned with what is ‘economic’ is a 
matter of largely maintaining its current view of what that idea involves, namely, the allocation of scarce 
resources focus, the principle that this occurs largely through markets, a general reliance on static 
analysis, and its rationality view of economic behavior, in particular, that people are utility maximizing 
decision-makers.  So economics retaining a relative autonomy as a science from this two-level 
perspective means that its appropriation of other science contents needs to respect these past and 
recent boundaries.  Consider, then, what this implies for the way in which psychology must enter into 
economics, and how this transforms economics imperialism. 
In effect, if economics’ adoption of other science contents is selective in the way suggested above, then 
it needs to carry out an ‘in-house’ economics imperialism with respect to any non-economic contents 
that are prospective candidates for absorption into economics.  Psychology’s heuristics understanding of 
human decision-making, as a specifically cognitive approach rather than a rational choice approach, is as 
such a non-economic view of choice behavior.  Thus for it to be absorbed into economics its non-
economic character must be somehow re-interpreted as economic, which we have seen has been 
accomplished in behavioral economics by explaining decision heuristics as biases from rational behavior.  
This ‘in-house’ economics imperialism thus involves the same principle of operation as has traditionally 
been understood to operate with economics imperialism except for the fact that the non-economics 
content which is subject to reframing as ‘economic’ is now examined directly on the terrain of 
economics rather than on the terrain of another science discipline.7  It might be argued, then, that this 
appropriation process could jeopardize the integrity of economics, because it is not clear whether 
psychological concepts are being reinterpreted as ‘economic’ or the reverse.   But if we take the relative 
autonomy assumption and the domestication argument seriously, then rather than being jeopardized by 
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 I expand on this ‘in-house’ argument (without using that expression) in terms of a core-periphery model of 
economics as a discipline in Davis (2012).  The argument is that within economics different research programs 
compete or sometimes simply function in parallel in disregard for one another in the non-core, periphery space of 
economics where other science ideas and principles are advanced and tested as candidate contents for economics.   
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its imports from other disciplines economics ought to be seen as reinforcing its main commitments.  This 
implies an important difference with the earlier economics imperialism of Becker.  If that imperialism 
was an inherently difficult project in virtue of needing to impose a foreign content on the other science 
domains to which economics was being applied, by contrast a behavioral economics imperialism seems 
to be a project with a reasonable prospect of succeeding because it brings an originally non-economic 
content (from psychology) to bear on whatever science domain to which it is applied – albeit after that 
non-economic content has been reframed as ‘economic.’  That is, because what behavioral economics 
seeks to apply elsewhere is less apparently ‘economic’ in its guise as economics made more realistic by 
psychology, its foreign character for the fields to which it is being applied is mitigated.  But appearances 
in this case are deceiving since behavioral economics following Kahneman and Tversky is still standard 
rationality theory under utility maximization.  Thus this new economics imperialism still fits the standard 
definition whereby non-economic domains are re-interpreted in terms of economic ideas and principles. 
What are the non-economic domains, then, which behavioral development economists target if they are 
to be characterized as imperialist?  Here it is helpful to see how behavioral development economics fits 
in to the recent history of development economics.  Not only, then, do behavioral development 
economists believe they have a new view of why people are poor that goes beyond past thinking on the 
subject, but they also believe they are in a position to resolve a long-standing policy debate in 
development economics (as for example between Jeffrey Sachs and William Easterly) over whether aid 
to developing countries is effective in addressing problems of development.  Note that development aid 
comes in the form of cash transfers to developing countries from developed ones and international 
organizations and agencies.  As such its disposition is largely under the jurisdiction of developing 
countries themselves, though donors do conditionalize this aid and give it for broadly defined purposes, 
such as food assistance, health, and education.  What is then argued by behavioral development 
economists is that rather than yes or no views of aid – Sachs (2005) favors it; Easterly (2006) opposes it – 
what they believe they can determine is how and when aid should be provided.  Banerjee and Duflo in 
Poor Economics (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011) make the most extensive case in this regard.  Using 
randomized control trial (RCT) field experiments, they argue they can determine at the micro-level how 
and when scarce aid monies ought to be used.  Their paradigm example is the provision of bed nets to 
the poor to combat malaria, especially in Africa.  Past experience with bed nets in many countries, 
particularly where they have been freely distributed, has met with uneven success in that those who 
receive them do not always make good use of them.  But why has this been the case?  Banerjee and 
Duflo worry about people’s default choices.  Perhaps mis-use and under-use of bed nets can be 
explained by people’s cognitive biases.  If these default choices can then be supplanted by ones that are 
rational in the sense of producing proper use of bed nets, then crippling problems such as malaria can 
be effectively addressed and aid effectively targeted.  Of course, they emphasize, what cognitive biases 
and decision heuristics people employ are usually not easy to determine, but the promise of the RCT 
method is that it will make it possible to get at precisely what motivates people’s choices.  Then in 
principle it should be possible to design policies and institutional arrangements that ‘nudge’ people 
toward rational defaults.  For example, in the case of bed nets, there seems to be some evidence that 
when people acquire their first bed nets at low subsidized prices, they are more inclined to buy and 
make good use of second bed nets at full prices (Banerjee and Duflo, Ibid., pp. 67-8).  Since many health 
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interventions depend on the willingness of individuals to make use of them – AIDS drugs are another 
example – the strategy of identifying the incentives that motivate people’s choices potentially has wide 
application. 
Behavioral development economics imperialism, then, begins by setting aside the conventional 
development economics framework in which aid agencies work through national governments to deliver 
such things as health services to local communities.  That framework is built around explanations of non-
economic phenomena such as political relationships and customary cultural values that fall within the 
domains of political science, law, history, and sociology.  One important dimension of this alternative 
framework concerns what are called collective action problems which involve the provision of non-
excludable goods, the supply of which depends on people cooperating with one another despite it being 
in their immediate interest not to do so.  Whether people cooperate in turn often depends on whether 
they have reason to trust one another, and whether they have a reason to trust one another further 
often depends on their social proximity.  This, however, is just what is missing in the development aid 
context, where people in local communities must determine whether they trust outsiders – a situation 
characterized as one of ‘generalized trust’ (Yamagishi, 2001) – in the person of government officials and 
representatives from aid agencies.  The case of bed nets, then, is just such a case.  It is a collective action 
problem because successfully combating malaria requires extensive participation from a community, 
and whether people cooperate in using bed nets can be influenced by how much they trust government 
officials and aid agency representatives who recommend their use.  It is possible, of course, to minimize 
the collective action character of bed net use, and see this is as strictly in the individual interest of those 
who use them.  But this overlooks how people establish what they believe to be in their self-interest, 
and how this can depend on not only whether they trust outsiders’ advice but even whether those in 
their own communities have set examples in this regard.  These kinds of considerations, however, are 
mostly at odds with behavioral development economics in virtue of its biases approach to decision 
heuristics, and consequently its approach is an imperialistic one in seeking to explain the non-economic 
as ‘economic.’ 
Compare, then, how a development economics informed by the Gigerenzer-ABC group approach might 
address aid and developing country health policy.  Their view of fast and frugal choice heuristics is that 
they are rules for solving choice problems that people regularly encounter, and are not all-purpose, one-
size-fits all rules (such as ‘maximize utility’), but are ecologically (rather than substantively) rational in 
the sense of being fit for use in specific types of circumstances.  Learning, then, how people’s decision 
heuristics influence their health requires first establishing why the rules they have are rational relative 
to the circumstances in which they are employed.  Thus to increase use of bed nets one does not ask 
why people fail to be rational about their use, but rather why it is rational for them to under-use them in 
those circumstances.   In this connection, Gigerenzer (2010) recommends we investigate what he refers 
to as social heuristics, or decision heuristics that people employ in environments which exhibit 
significant social group dynamics.  Examples are imitate-your-peers, tit-for-tat, follow-an-authority, and 
if-there-is-a-default-do-nothing.  These rules are not necessarily in play in all social circumstances, and 
they obviously can produce conflicting guidance to people.  But they provide one way of investigating 
how people living in local communities in developing economies might choose whether they wish to 
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cooperate with one another and the policy initiatives of outsiders.  This, then, provides an alternative 
basis for a development economics informed by psychology, though in this case a development 
economics formulated in terms of such social psychology concepts as social groups, communities, social 
relationships within societies, etc.  Needless to say, concepts such as these have little place in behavioral 
development economics.  This raises a further question: how should we understand the relationship 
between the expert policy advice wish to provide and the people in developing economy societies? 
I claim that behavioral development economists claiming to offer expert policy advice to developing 
economy societies are vulnerable to the charge of being imperialist in the social and cultural sense of 
that term.  The concept of imperialism was originally associated with developed countries’ political and 
economic domination of developing societies in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries, 
but after World War II it has also been associated with developed country efforts to impose their values, 
philosophies, and social and cultural practices on people in developing societies – a post-colonial 
cultural imperialism (see Said, 1994).  Note, then, that providing expert policy advice to people in 
developing societies does not per se count as imperialist in this sense, since expert policy need not be 
formulated in a manner that suppresses or disregards social values and practices in those societies.8  It is 
also important to distinguish between the experts themselves and the advice they provide, since the 
personal attitudes of individual experts are often not culturally imperialist, and frequently quite the 
opposite in their awareness of and concern for cultural differences.  What does, however, create 
grounds for the charge that behavioral development economics is imperialist in the social and cultural 
sense is the paternalist dimensions of its ‘nudge’ view of economic policy, especially when we 
emphasize contemporary differences between developed and developing countries.  Consider, then, 
how the ‘nudge’ view of economic policy takes on different meanings in the two cases. 
Developed economies, it seems fair to say, are generally more liberal economies in the sense that their 
societies are generally organized around market relationships.  In contrast, though of course markets 
operate extensively in developing economies, their societies also possess many non-liberal economic 
relationships, some of which, such as how local communities are organized through traditional 
institutions, provide them cooperative solutions to collective action problems associated with non-
excludable goods provision (see for example, Panzironi and Gelber, 2012).  Thus while ‘nudge’ 
paternalism in liberal market societies may be no more interventionist in people’s lives than other forms 
of economic policy which influence their choices, in developing economies reconfiguring economic 
institutions and redesigning choice architectures is paternalist in a much stronger way in that it can 
cause changes in people’s conceptions of themselves and their societies.  That is, economic policy is 
successful in the heuristics and biases approach when it leads people to behave as rational utility 
maximizers even should they be disposed to act otherwise due to established trust relationships, 
customary practices, identification with social groups, etc.  In contrast, when fast and frugal heuristics 
view is formulated in terms of social heuristics, it leaves the door open to development policies which 
build on existing social institutions.  This points us to a basic difference between the how the two 
                                                          
8
For example, Duflo, Kremer, and Robinson (2010) evaluate a program that addresses how farmers spend cash on 
fertilizer that emphasizes farmers’ existing patterns of decision-making rather than impose pre-given views of 
rational finance.  
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approaches underlie development policy, and shows the vulnerability of behavioral development 
economics with its heuristics and biases approach to the charge of being culturally imperialist. 
 
5 Economics imperialism under the impact of other disciplines 
The argument above treats behavioral development economics imperialism as an economics-plus-
psychology imperialism or a social science imperialism under the leadership of economics.  Why not just 
refer to this as economics imperialism without the more complex label, since the effect of this 
imperialism seems to be largely the same as economics imperialism was previously understood, that is, 
in each case economics imposes its discourse on subject matters previously addressed by other 
disciplines?  Indeed, just as Becker’s economics of the family applies utility maximization reasoning to 
household organization, which has long been explained by other social scientists in terms of sociological 
and psychological ideas, so behavioral development economics applies this reasoning to household 
organization in developing societies, as in the bed net case, which similarly has other social science 
explanations.  However, there is an important difference between the two cases, which was tied in the 
discussion above to the idea of an ‘in-house’ imperialism which economics practices toward candidate 
concepts and principles being imported from other disciplines.  The idea of an ‘in-house’ imperialism 
was used to explain the process of appropriation as ‘domestication,’ but the latter idea is of course is 
subject to a host of qualifications concerning the degree to which candidate other science materials are 
made or found to conform to what economists regard as ‘economic.’  At one end of the spectrum, then, 
it seems fair to say there are cases in which economics largely frames the other science disciplinary 
materials it admits; at the other end are cases in which the exporting discipline largely frames the 
concerns of economics.  The case examined in this paper is the former sort, but to assume only one case 
always applies cannot be justified, since the long history of economics is not one of doctrinal continuity 
but rather of changing paradigms interspersed with periods of competition between rival approaches 
(see, Davis, 2008).9  Thus it quite possible that economics is transformed in substantive ways, including 
how it is defined, by its imports of other science contents.10 
Under this latter scenario, it thus seems odd to speak of economics imperialism.  But if it is nonetheless 
professional economists promoting ‘economic’ interpretations of non-economic phenomena, even 
when their theories are framed by other disciplines, it seems we are nonetheless still talking about 
economics imperialism.  How are we to sort this all out?  I suggest that we use the idea of a social 
science imperialism under the leadership of economics rather than the traditional economics 
imperialism idea for the following reasons.  First, this expanded framework preserves the agency role of 
economists, which, as in account of experts above, tells us important things about the vehicles and 
                                                          
9
 The doctrinal continuity view flows from the Whig interpretation of history of ideas whereby contemporary 
figures see all history in a self-serving way as leading up to their own theories.  For the late historian Mark Blaug’s 
critique of this rationalist historiography, see Davis (2013).   
 
10
 As for example argued regarding the origins of neoclassical economics by Mirowski (1989).  Thus the classical 
economics definition of economics is different from the Robbins definition for neoclassical economics. 
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conceptual mechanisms of an economics/social science imperialism.  Second, it accommodates inter- 
and cross-disciplinary social science developments, such as the spread of cognitive science thinking in 
the postwar period across many disciplines, in a way that is consistent with the relative autonomy of 
economics (and other social sciences) in an environment in which cross-disciplinary imports have 
become common.  Third, the ‘leadership’ idea tells us something about disciplinary hierarchies in social 
science and society, and in particular about the priority given in contemporary society to ‘economic’ 
explanations of the world.  Fourth, the broader idea implicates other sciences in social and cultural 
imperialism carried out by developed economy science as a whole, arguably providing a better 
understanding of the command it exercises over developing society values and institutions.  Fifth, the 
larger framework helps correct the over-estimation of economics’ as an all-encompassing social science. 
As emphasized, the arguments here depend on the assumption that economics retains its relative 
autonomy in an environment of imports from other sciences.  But one can also consider a state of affairs 
in which this autonomy is only nominal and the framing of economics by other disciplines makes it 
difficult to think of economics as a separate science.  What this might involve also seems worthy of 
investigation. 
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